c2 


PRESIDENT  DAVIS 


HIS  ADMINISTRATION. 


A    REVIEW    OF   THE  "RIVAL   ADMINISTRATION 
LATELY    PUBLISHED    IN    RICHMOND,  AND 
WRITTEN  BY  E.  A.  POLLARD,  AlTli 
OF   THE    "  FIRST    AND  ND 

FEARS  OF  THE  WAR." 


.A.. 


A.T3FLA.TSA&7 


AUTHOR  OF       A  HI.I.  ASD  DKT.WLI.I)  UfeTOKY  OF  Till 


ATLANTA,  GEORGIA: 

PUBLISHED    FOR    THE    AUTHOR. 

1864. 


ERRATUM. 


■ 


F"r  the  word ''misrepresented"  on  the  tenth  line  in  the  preface,  read 
1  deemed  offensive." 


PRESIDENT  DAVIS 


HIS  ADMINISTRATION, 


A   REVIEW    OF  THE  "RIVAL   ADMINISTRATIONS," 

LATELY    PUBLISHED    IN    RICHMOND,  AND 

WRITTEN  BY  E.  A.  POLLARD,  AUTHOR 

OF    THE    "FIRST    AND    SECOND 

YKARS  OF  THE  WAR." 


ZQ-ST    A.-    S.    ABRAMS, 

Urn- OR  Of  "  A  FT1.L  1ID  DKTATUCP  BlffTCRT  or  TEBtnWS  Of  T1CKS81BQ. 


ATLANTA,  GEORGIA: 

PUBLISHED    FOR    THE    AUTHOR. 

1864, 


Jfcn.  ^evt./W^ 


PREFACE 


The  object  of  this  pamphlet  is  purely  to  reriew  the  late  attack  on  the 
administration,  and  to  do  justice  to  those  who  have  been^placed  in  charge 
of  the  government,  believing  that  Mr.  Pollard  has  acted  very  unjustly 
towards  the  President  and  his  Cabinet. 

It  haying  been  said,  by  those  who  hare  seen  the  within  pages,  while  in 
manuscript,  that  they  may  be  construed  into  a  personal  attack  on  the 
author  of  the  Rival  Administrations,  the  author  of  this  review,  while 
declaring  that  his  purpose  is  simply  to  defend  the  admintetration  from 
Mr.  Pollai 
object 
sponsible  for  every  word  contained  therein. 


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Atlanta,  Georota,  February,  196S.  # 


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PRESIDENT  DAVIS 


up 


HIS   ADMINISTRATION 


EAFIKB  I. 

History  aud  historians  aro  generally  8tt]  to  be  truthful 

and  impartial;  narrating  events  as  they  oceur,  giving  praise  even 
to  an  enemy,  when  he  deserves  it,  and  only  censuring  wher 
voiee  of  the  people  conder*i|^ This  course  has  been  pursued  by 
all  historians  prior  to  (he  writing  of  the  history  of  this  revolu- 
tion, when  we  find  its  use^  corrupted  with  a  view  to  cir 
the  venom  of  a  partisan  spirit,  and  under  a  semblance  of  mng- 
nanimous  candor,  an  aUejnpt«to  utter  sentiments,  not  only 
but  utterly  ignored  and  repudiated  by  the  masses  of  the  people. 

"We  have  been  induced  to  tl  i  pam- 

phlet containing  a  violent  attack  on  the  administration 
dent  Davis,  which  is  so  palpably  fa]  it  would  require  no 

noticevdjd  not  a  pre-Rcr,  regard  for  jthe  . statesman- whom  the 
people  of  th<>  Confederate  Si 

in  tlie  republic,  demaml  that  such-gr  truth,  anti 

a  partisan  attack,  such  as  the  "Rival  Administrations"  undoubt- 
edly is,  should  be  fully  rciV  i  dignity  laid  I 
people. 

0  The. :  folio  wing,  pages  are  not  intended  as  a  praise  of  the  Pres- 
ident. We  are  no  partisan  of  the  administration,  as  the  thou- 
sands who  have  read  the  "History  of  the  Siege  of  Vicksbnrg," 
and  "Review  of  the  War,"  can  testify.  Ours  is  but  to  defend 
from  a  gross  and  unmanly  assault  the  President  who,  with  all 
his  faults,  is  universally  acknowledged  to  be  the  most  able  man 
in  the  Confederate  States.  That  he  has  erred  in  some  instances 
we  will  not  deny,  but  that  his  errors  have  been  so  serious  as  to 
warrant  the  attack  made  on  him  by  the  author  of  "  The  Rival 
Administrations,"  we  not  only  deny,  but  endeavor  to  prove  our 
denial. 


>  CHAPTER  II. 

Let  us  lake  a  glance  back  at  years  previous  to  the  war,  and 
we  find  Jefferson  Davis  holding  a. prominent  position  in  the 
councils  of  the  United  States.  Not  only  were  his  private  qual- 
ities unimpeachable,  and  his  literary  ability  of  high  order,  but 
he  was  known  as,  and  considered  an  able  statesman  in  the  Sen- 
ate of  the  United  States.  To  deny  this  fact  is  to  speak  falsely. 
None  who  are  acquainted  with  the  history  of  the  causes  which 
led  to  the  disruption  of  the  Union,  can  fail  to  recollect  Jefferson 
Davis  as  holding  a  prominent  position  on  the  Southern  side  of 
the  various  questions  then  at  issue,  and  considered  as  one  of  the 
most  talented  statesmen  of  this  continent.  To  deny  it,  we  have 
said,  is  false,  and  not  only  false,  but  a  perversion  of  history.  If 
Jefferson  Davis  "  had  never  been  accounted  as  a  statesman," 
how  was  it  that  the  convention  which  met  at  Montgomery,  Al- 
abama, unanimously  elected  him  President  of  the  Provisional 
government  ?  This  question  we  deem  sufficient  to  refute  the 
statement  of  Mr.  Pollard,  that  the  President  was  never  consid- 
ered a  statesman  in  the  old  government.  His  election  was  not 
the  result  of  intrigue.  He  was  hundreds  of  miles  away  when 
the  convention  elected  him.  In^je  quiet  of  his  country  home,, 
like  a  second  Cincinnatus,  he  received  intelligence  that  he  had 
been  elected  to  preside  over  the  destinies  of  the  new-born  re- 
jDublic.  If  he  had  never  been  considered  a  statesman,  would  his 
services  have  been  sought  after  by  a  convention  composed  of 
the  first  statesmen  of  the  South?  Facts  show  the  falsity  of 
this  statement,  as  well  as  the  voice  of  impartial  history. 

"We  now  enter  upon  President  Davis'  administration  of  the 
affairs  of  the  Confederacy.  The  first  charge  brought  against 
him  is  "his  choice  of  officers  in  the  field."  In  what  manner 
has  his  choice  of  officers  proved  so  detrimental  to  the  Souths 
when  compared  with  the  happy  selections  he  has  made^.  "The 
President  depreciated  Price  as  a  militiaman,"  says  Mr.  Pollard  ; 
but  that  gentleman  fails  to  tell  us  in  what  instance  General 
Price  has  shown  himself  possessed  of  ability  to  fill  a  higher 
position  than  he  now  occupies.  The  fact  is  that  General  Price 
has  been  an  over-estimated  man,  and  the  President  knows  it. 
With  respect  to  his  "light  opinion  of  Beauregard,"  this  i», 
simply  false,  as  the  conduct  of  the  President  towards  that  offi- 
cer, after  the  battle  of  Manassas  was  of  the  most  appreciative 
nature  possible.  It  is  true,  that  from  some  cause  or  other,  the 
feeling  between  the  President  and  General  Beauregard  has  not 
been  of  as  cordial  a  nature  as  could  be  desired,  but  the  best  ac- 
count of  the  causes  which  led  to  such  disagreement,  state  that 
it  was  from  the  refusal  of  the  President  to  permit  an  advance 
of  the  Confederate  army  on  Washington  after  the  battle  of 
Manassas.     So  far  from  having  a  poor  appreciation,  the  Presi- 


% 

dent,  we  are  certaiD,  has  the  highest  possible  opinion  of  the 
hero  of  Manassas,  Shiloh  and  Charleston. 

The  next  favorite  the  President  is  charged  with  1 
General  Pemberton*     Of  this  officer  we  are  not,  prepared  to 
say  anything  favorable.     We  have  condemned  him  as  incompe- 
tent before,  and  so  consider  him  still.     At  the  same  time  we  see 
no  reason  why  the  President  shai!  ler 

him  an  able  of5e#,  and  with  that  belief  no  one  can  blame  him' 
for  retaining  <  r<  r-Hral  Pemberton  in  his  confidence.     Of  General 
Lovell  no  more  need  be  said  than  the  fact  that  he  was  1*1 
acquitted  of  all  cba  incompetency;  while  of  General 

Bragcr,  the  President  never  displayed  greater  ability  and  firm- 
ness" than  when  he  refused  to  relieve  him  from  command,  for  not 
only  are  the  military  abiliti*  -  of  General  Bragg  appreciated  by 
a  large  majority  of  his  army,  and 

Johnston— a  military  authority,  we  think,  of  some  important 
These,   then,   arc  the  "favorites"  which   President  Davis   is 
charged  with  having  selected  for  the  field,  and  uas  unapt  as  his 
selection  of  political  advisers  in  the  cabinet." 

Mr.  Pollard  says  that  "the  civil  administration  of  Mr.  Davis 
had  fallen  to  a  low  ebb."    ThU  uieally  false.    Tlu*  V 

ident  has  ever  been  looked  npofl  by  tl 

an  able  and  efficient  servant  of  the  Confederacy,  and  as  the  only 
man  in  the  South  who  cOuld  till  the  ofhYe  he  holds  with  as  much 
success.     "We  -peak  the  scntil  }>l<\  not  \ho  pri- 

vate opinions  of  a  partisan  feeling.  That  the  administration 
possesses  the  confidence  -  f  the  |  irent  01. 

the  tour  oi'  tl  i    PK  -ident   through  the  dill  5  tatef,  a  short 

time  after  the  battle  of  Chic  .  |  tion  was  enthu- 

siastic, and  «•  how  he  would  have  I  well 

1  by  them,  if  his  administration  had  fallen  to  s<>  low  an 
ebb. 

Bnttheuttei  ion  of  fa  I  iore  glaring,  when 

Mr.  Pollard  tells  u  that  "there  are  certain  minds  which  cannot 
see  how  want  of  capacity  in  our  government,  official  sniftli 
M,  and  the  mismanagement  of  public  afl  consist  with 

*  While  we  will  never  attempt  to  deny  that  progs  incompetency  charact 
of  General  Pembeiton,  we  must,  nev<  rtbeless,  from  personal  know).  it  Yicksburg 

mur  erer  surrendered  before  u  •  naweTeexba  atthe 

soldiers  had  to  eat  mules  is  not  a  "  sehood,"  f  r  bui  t>  wa-  really  the  case;  th'- 

writer  of  thete  lines  having  eaten  the  flesh  of  mules  himself,  for  want  of  oilier  meat."  As  a 
proof  that  there  was  no  provisirns  remaining,  except,  perhaps,  what  was  u  I  itals, 

we  would  state  that  the  Confederate  forces  remained  without  food  fr<  m  the  Sa'urday  the  sur- 
render took  place  until  the  following  Monday,  when  they  drew  rations  from  the  Federal  itort*% 
the  commissary  of  our  army  being  empty.     These  are  facts,  and  we  dffy  denial. 

Mr.  Pollard  exhibits  a  deplorable  ignorance  of  the  position  of  the  two  armies  in  Mississippi, 
when  he  6tates  that  the  "  importunate  entreaties  of  Bowen"  were  denied,  on  the  "  more  unfor- 
tunate day  of  Big  Black,"  when  he  (Bowen)  had  sent  seven  or  eight  couriers  ta  Pemberton  for 
ieinforcements.  This  is  not  only  false,  but  displays  an  unpardonable  amount  of  ignorance. 
At  the  Battle  of  Big  Black  no  reinforcerr  ents  were  ever  sent  for,  because  they  were  not  needed. 
At  the  fiist  attack  of  the  enemy,  the  Confederate  army,  which  had  been  defeated  the  day  be- 
fore, brcke  i  nd  retreated  across  the  river. 

The  number  of  men  composing  Grant's  army  was  not  50,000  but  80,000,  a  fact  the  writer 
learnt  from  the  best  Federal  information,  wink-  a  prisoner  at  Vicksburg.  Fifty  thousand  men 
eculd  not  have  defeated  tlie  Confederate  army  in  the  manner  they  did. 


the  undeniable  facts  of  the  success  of  our  arms,  and  the  great 
achievment8  of  the  Confederacy."  Sensible  and  impartial  minds 
cannot  see  it.  Nor  is  it  possible  that  in  a  revolution  of  this 
nature,  confronted  as  the  South  is  by  a  foe  of  great  numbers 
and  energy,  the  "  valor  and  determination  of  the  people  may 
make  considerable  amends  for  the  faults  of  its  governors."  It- 
would  be  a  matter  of  impossibility  for  the  South  to  achieve 
a  single  success,  were  she  not  guided  by  the  wisdom  of  a  central 
power.  The  people  are  merely  the  followersjpf  the  rulers  they 
have  appointed  to  preside  over  the  destinies  ol  the  country,  and 
they  would  have  no  opportunity  to  show  their  "  valor  and  de- 
termination" were  they  not  led  to  it  by  those  in  authority. 

Nor  has  the  "  history  of  this  war  proved  one  proposition 
clearly,"  "that  in  all  its  subjects  of  congratulation  the  'states- 
manship* of  Richmond  had  little  part  in  it."  We  also  "  deny 
the  justice  of  this  historical  (?)  judgment,  which  refuses  to  at- 
tribute to  the  official  authorities  of  this  government,  such  success 
as  we  have  had  in  this  war."  No  "  history"  of  this  war  has  yet 
been  written.  In  the  two  volumes  issued,  and  the  pamphlet 
now  before  us,  we  find  a  narrative  of  the  different"  civil  and  mil- 
itary operations  compiled  together,  for  the  purpose  of  covering 
an  unmanly  attack  upon  the  President.  And  when  the  assertion 
is  broadly  made  that  no  success  achieved  by  the  South  in  this 
contest  can  be  attributed  to  the  administration,  we  not  only 
deny  it,  but  come  prepared  to  show  where  the  administration 
is  worthy  of,  and  has  received  the  heartfelt  praises  of  the  coun- 
try. 

We  will  take  a  glance  back  at  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  and 
the  evacuation  of  Nashville,  and  endeavor  to  find  out  what  was 
the  conduct  of  the  administration  in  this  emergency.  The  whole 
South  teemed  with  invectives  against  General  Albert  Sydney 
♦Johnston.  His  soldiers  commenced  deserting  him.,  and  the 
people  refused  to  enlist  under  his  banner.  In  this  emergency, 
the  conduct  of  the  administration  was  admirable.  General 
Beauregard  was  sent  to  Tennessee,  men  and  means  were  placed 
his  disposal  by  the  government  in  a  most  lavish  manner,  and  a 
glorious  campaign  was  the  result. 

Let  us  look  further  back  to  the  seven  days  of  battle  before 
Richmond.  Were  they  solely  the  result  of  the  "  valor  and  de- 
termination of  the  people  ?" 

Again  we  view  the  action  of  the  administration  in  the  retreat 
of  Bragg  from  Chattanooga — the  brilliant  victory  of  Chicka- 
rnanga,  and  we  ask  if  the  people  alone  must  receive  praise  for 
that  success. 

On  another  page  Mr.  Pollard  says :  u  We  do  not  know  of  any 
real  and  substantial  particulars  in  which  the  administration  of 
Mr.  Davis  has  contributed  to  the  war."  Here  is  another  asser- 
tion which  can  be  refuted  without  saying  a  great  deal.  Look 
at  the  position  which  Mr.  Davis*  administration  has  placed  the 


Sonth  in,  and  who  can  remain  blind  to  the  good  it  has 
What  revolutionary  pnrty,  however  strong,  ever  maintained  as 
much  territory  as  the  South  does  at  the  present  time,  after  three 
years  of  fighting?     None!     And   to  whom    ean  we  attribute 
this  "  substantial"  fact  ?     Not  to  the  people. 

But  if  all  the  buoi  lieved  by  the  Sonth  ai  attri- 

buted to  the  people  alone,  why  shall  they  not  be 
the  responsibility  of  defeat?   "it  is  an  outage  upon  justice  to 
charge  the  administration  v*  '  ail  the 

tcrs  which  have  occurred,  and  endeavor  to  gain  *  ilarity 

of  the  people  by  declaring  that  they  alone  ai  it 

the  successes  of  oar  arms.     It  is  the  pra  i    jogue 

andnot  the.  historian.  Writers  of  history  confii 
to  facts,  and  never  allow  their  feelings  of  animt  > 
truth  and  commit  injustice. 


CHAPTER  III. 

It  is  generally  the  case  that  after  an  enigm  I 
all  parties  find  out  how  simple  it  wa  . 

der  at  the  dullness  of  another  in   not  - 
the  time  that  ho  was  one  of  th<  re  want 

prevented  its  solution.     This  is  the  rise  with  Mr.  Poll  •    I 
he  gravely  tells  the  people  that  "  it  i  ■  I  to  1  K>k 

back  upon  the  current*  of  our  history,  t  the  blin  ' 

and    littleness  of  min  I,  the   conceit,  the 

sighted  management,  in   all  which  ;nto   this 

present  v  11  A  war  and  depths  of  disti 

and  littleness  of  mind'" 

the  one  or  the  other  To  th  -       mas 

all  hope  for  peace  had  departed,  a  powerful  ai  raised 

and  put  in  the  Held.    Jefferson  Davis  assnmi  >1  of  a  gov- 

ernment, or  rather  revolutionary  party,  without  its  1. 
form  of  government.  With  the  skill  of  a  statesman  he  mould- 
ed that  revolutionary  party  into  a  model  government,  in  a  few 
short  weeks.  Civil  and  military  departments  were  put  in  ope- 
ration wit  hing  energy  and  rapidity.  He  measured  the 
necessity  of  the  South  by  the  strength  of  the  North.  The 
President  saw  not  before  him  a  war  of  indefinite  duration;  no 
one  saw  it.  It  was  a  gift  of  far-sightedness  which  only  the 
craven  hearted  and  sol  disant  patriots  posf  None  else 
saw  it.  Yancey,  Cobb,  Stephens  and  Benjamin,  distingnl 
statesmen  on  the  civil,  and  Johnston,  Lee  and  Beauregard  on 
the  military  side,  failed  to  sec  an  endless  war.  The  President 
was  not  gifted  with  a  glance  into  futurity.  He  saw  seventy-five 
-thousand  Northern  men  first  arrayed  in  arms  against  the  South, 


10 

and  he  prepared  for  that  number.  He  next  saw  five  hundred 
thousand,  and  he  prepared  for  that  number  also.  Did  that  ex- 
hibit " blindness"  or  " littleness  of  mind?"  Surely  there  was 
no  necessity  for  calling  out  the  entire  strength  of  the  South  at 
one  time  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  a  comparative  handful  of 
men.  To  have  done  so  would  have  been  short-sightedness  in- 
deed, and  totally  unworthy  the  statesman  we  claim  Prcsidert 
Davis  to  be. 

It  is  charged  by  Mr.  Pollard  that  the  administration,  to  have 
exhibited  any  marks  of  statesmanship,  should  have  discovered 
that  this  war  would  be  one  of  several  years'  duration,  but  he 
gives  no  one  instance  where  such  far-seeing  statesmanship  has 
been  shown.  Not  on  this  continent,  for  Calhoun  and  Webster, 
the  two  farthest-seeing  statesmen  that  America  ever  had,  could 
never  see  a  greater  calamity  occurring  to  this  continent,  than 
the  disruption  of  the  Union.  They  never  saw  war  resulting 
from  it.  Nor  can  we  find  in  European  history  any  evidence  of 
such  far-seeing  statesmanship  as  that  desired  by  Mr.  Pollard. 
Take  as  an  instance  the  wars  which  raged  during  the  time  of 
Napoleon  Buonaparte.  Surely  no  far-seeing  statesmanship  was 
exhibited  in  Europe  at  that  period.  Noneof  the  statesmen  of 
that  continent  saw  in  the  ruler  of  France,  a  man  who  would- 
deluge  nearly  every  nation  on  that  continent  with  blood.  Is  it,, 
then,  a  wonder  that  the  administration  should  have  failed  to  see 
that  the  war  would  extend  to  years  ?  The  idea  is  ridiculous ;  it 
is  devoid  of  sound  reasoning. 

Referring  to  the  neglect  of  the  Confederate  Government  to 
purchase  and  provide  all  the  necessary  appliances  of  warfare, 
Mr.  Pollard  says  that  "Secretary  Mallory  laughed  off  con- 
tractors in  New  Orleans,  who  offered  to  sell  to  the  government 
a  large  amount  of  navy  supplies."  On  what  grounds  is  this 
assertion  made  ?  We  have  good  reasons  for  knowing,  that  not 
only  was  a  large  quantity  of  navy  supplies  purchased  in  New 
Orleans  for  the  department,  but  all  in  fact  that  could  be  got  at- 
that  time  in  the  city,  and  a  large  quantity,  had  to  be  sent  from 
Memphis  to  New  Orleans  to  complete  the  cotton  clad  fleet 
which  was  built  there.  Here  then  is  an  assertion  made  with- 
out waiting  to  ascertain  the  fact,  but  purely,  as  we  suppose,  on 
the  statement  of  irresponsible  parties.  We  shall,  however,  re- 
fer to  the  subject  of  the  Navy  Department  in  another  chapter. 
Immediately  below  this  tirade  against  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  we  find  Judah  P.  Benjamin  and  the  President  charged 
with  short-sightedness  for  expressing  their  opinion  (in  the  Fall 
of  1802)'  that  the  war  would  soon  come  to  an  end.  The  posi-< 
tion  of  the  Confederacy  warranted  the  opinion  that  the  war 
would  soon  come  to  an  end.  The  North  had  commenced  to 
exhibit  signs  of  dissatisfaction  at  the  reverses  her  arms  had  met  - 
during  the  past  months.  European  nations  were  also  of  opin- 
ion that  the  war  could  not  last  much  longer.    The  "great  poll- 


11 

ticians*'  of  England,  in  pnblic  speeches,  expressed  their  convic- 
tions that  the  Xori  ower  over  the 
Southern"  The  brilliant  cami  f  Lee  in  Virginia, 
Bragg  in  Teni  Lana,  and  the  snecesful  tie- 
fence  of  Vicksburg,  combined  t  >  form  a:  then  the  ' 
eran  opinion  t1              war  would  soon  come  to  an  en 

there  any  "wa  jht  and  judgment  displayed  l»y 

the  Cob  fed  er  at  i  p,  in  their  calculation  at  the  dinerenl 

riods  of  the  war,  of  the  course  likely  ,1  by  Europe 

and  the  North."     It  wag  never  doubted  that  the  North 
fi^ht,  but  t1  ere  wa«  ubt  it'  s1  ' :  not  be 

•mmereial  community,  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of 
gain,"  but  because  her  •  mlikc  those  of  "Carthage, 

Venice,  Genoa,  Holland  and  England,"  shewed  that  their  belli' 
gerent  powers  were  not  of  the  order.     Take,  as  an  in- 

stance, the  Mexican  Mar,  and  we  find  that  the  North,  alt! 
two-thirds  as  populous  as  the  South.   -  •         ly  one-third  of  the 
total  amount  of  men  who  volunteered. 

These  facts  are,  in  themselves,  posse  s<  d  of  great  weight,  and 
from  them  must  Statesmen  form  '  the  political  status  of 

a  people.  The  history  of  one  nation,  which  we  find  "in  bo 
is  not  likely  to  be  the  history  of  another.  It  is,  therefore,  ab- 
surd to  charge  the' Administration  with  shortsightedness,  be- 
cause it  failed  to  see  what  no  one  saw  until  time  had  developed 
it.  Such  charges  are  but  the  emanations  of  a  mind  filled  with 
a  vain  conceit  of  its  own  intellectual  penetration,  when  in  fact 
it  only  shows   US   wii.i  •  have  seen  developed 

through  passing  events. 

Mr.  Pollard's  l*  hasty  and  ps  Admin- 

istration for  its  "o&Igti  rice  and  England," 

is  tie  most  "ludicrous,"  as  well  tmi  e  ever 

seen  in  pi  int.     He  tells  us  "the  idea  is  ludicrous,  now  that,  at 
the  very  beginning  of  the  American  revolution,  Franc* 
England,  with  their  centuri< 

peace  ami  war,  would  fling  t  hems  eh  i  convulsion  which 

their  great  politicians  easily  saw  was  the  most  tremendous  of 
modern  times."  We  see  nothing  "ludicrous"  in  the  idea,  for 
the  past  policy  of  England  and  prance,  .dvan- 

tages  which  a  disruption  of  thi  -an   Union   gave  them> 

made  it  very  natural  to  entertain  the  opinion  that  they  would 
be  willing  to  recognize  the  independence  <>t  the  Confederacy  as 
soon  as  it  had  given  sufficient  evidence  of  its  ability  to  main- 
tain it.*    Nor  was  this  even  necessary,  for  when  we  look  at  the 


*****  It  was  universally  acknowledged  by  all  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  that  the 
South  could  never  be  conquered,  and  France  went  so  far  as  to  make  propositions  to  England 
for  an  united  action  in  regard  to  American  affair?.  Both  these  offers  were  rejected,  not  because 
England  doubted  the  ability  of  the  South  to  maintain  her  independence,  but  because  her  in- 
terest prompted  a  continuance  of  the  war.  The  South  was  thus  left  alone,  and  a  war  allowed 
to  continue,  only  to  gratify  the  selfish  spirit  of  an  European  nation.  It  may  sound  very  strange 
fer  a  citif.cn  of  the  South  to  accuse  a  foreign  government  of  a  continuation  of  the  war,  and 
thus  implying  that  the  Confederacy  had  no  ability  to  ftop  it  herself.  Such  Lb  not  our  idea.  That 


t9 

conduct  of  England  toward  Greece,  Italy,  and  oilier  countries 
which  have  regained  or  achieved  independence  by  revolution, 
we  find  tbatshe  has  either  recognized  their  nationality,  or  lent 
them  material  aid.  Besides  which,  the  universally  acknowl- 
edged sovereignty  of  the  different  States,  composing  the  Con- 
federacy and  their  claim  to  the  right  of  secession,  give  the  Ad- 
ministration a  further  right  to  claim  recognition.  We  shall  not, 
however,  attempt  to  prove  any  further  the  claim  of  the  Con- 
federacy for  recognition  ;  President  Davis  has  shown  that  in  his 
State  papers,  in  the  most  unquestionable  manner  possible ;  suffi- 
cient to  say,  that  even  the  press  of  those  foreign  governments, 
which  Mr.  Pollard  seems  so  desirous  of  defending,  have  ac- 
knowledged the  legality  of  the  claim  set  up  by  the  President. 
The  foregoing  defense  of  England  is  followed  bv  the  remark, 


gr. 

power  of  England  would  submit  to  the  ineffable  humiliation  of 
acknowledging  its  dependence  on  the  infant  Confederacy  of  tho 
South."  Here  we  find  no  just  and  truthful  statement  of  the 
causes  which  made  cotton  pronounced  "King."  "We are  shown 
no  grounds  on  which  the  rulers  of  the  South  based  their  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  cotton.  All  that  we  see  in  this  attack,  is  an 
attempt  to  defend  England  against  the -well  merited  rebuke 
which  President  Davis  has  administered  to  that  nation.  It 
looks,  in  fact,  more  liko  a  desire  to  court  popularity  among  the 
government  and  people  of  England,  by  defending  them  in  a 
cause  ^which  even  their  own  journals  have  declared  partial  and 
unjust.      That  there  is  any  argument  in  this  defense   of   the 

the  South  has  the  ability  to  briog  this  war  to  a  successful  issue,  we  not.  only  firmly  believe,  ba 
know  it,  as  a  fact.  Still,  to  review  the  conduct  of  (ireat  Britain,  so  far  as  it  is  connected  with 
this  war,  no  one  can  fail  to  see,  that  had  any  revolutionary  party  in  Europe  achieved  half  the 
tmccesse*  that  the  South  achieved  in  thejyear  of  lS&i,  she  would  not  only  have  recognised  it, 
but  have  been  an  ally. 

It  was  not  slavery  alone  which  prevented  the  interference  of  England  in  this  struggle. — 
Strongly  prejudiced  as  she  is  against  the  "  peculiar  institution"  of  tiw  South,  and,  great  aa  is 
the  obstacle  which  it  places  before  recognition,  it  could  have  been  surmounted,  but  for  the  good 
tvhieh  the  war  has  done  to  the  shippiug  and  mercantile  interests  of  that  country.  Cotton  was 
and  is  a  great  consideration  with  them.  Its  los3  has  reduced  to  beggary  thousands  who  de- 
pended on  that  staple  for  support.  Of  this,  however,  England  cares  but  little.  No  matter  thai 
this  continence  deluged  with  blood,  and  from  every  home  in  Manchester  and  Lancashire  th-, 
ery  of  starvation  ascends,  she  will  never  move  a  step  to  ooviate  it,  while  such  misery  increases! 
her  boasted  mercantile  superiority  on  the  water,  and  adds  so  much  additional  gold  to  her  revenue. 

Such  was  the  political  position  of  the  Confederacy  with  Europe,  or  strictly  speaking,  with. 
England  and  France,  in  the  year  1SS2.  That  the  South  had  a  perfect  right  to  expect  recogni- 
tion, no  impartial  mind  can  deny.  She  had  just  emerged  from  a  campaign  which  had  covered 
her  arms  with  glory,  and  made  her  illustrious  in  history.  She  had  driven  from  her  soil  in  dis 
grace  and  humiliating  rout,  a  foe  numbering  not  les3  than  six  hundred  thousand  of  the  flower 
of  the  North.  From  a  population  of  eight  millions  she  has  raised  an  army  of  four  hundred 
thousand  men— a  number  never  before  known  in  any  nation  of  the  same  strength  in  population. 
On  all  sides  she  conironted  the  foe  with  bands  of  patriots  flushed  with  recent  victories,  and 
filled  with  determination.  It  was  a  situation  never  before  known  in  the  annals  of  a  revolution. 
History  doe3  not  show  a  single  instance  where  a  revolutionary  party  ever  maintained  the  in- 
tegrityt of  their  soil  with  as  much  success  as  did  the  Confederacy.  All  these  facts  combined, 
make  it  apparent  that  the  anticipations  of  recognition  by  the  South,  was  perfectly  ratiouaL, 
under  the  circumstances.  She  had  fairly  earned  it,  and  had  recognition  followed  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Sharpsburg,  the  North  would  have  been  willing  to  recognize  ths  South  also,  but  the  cold- 
ness of  foreigu  countries  encouraged  her  to  further  efforts  at  subjugation,  and  the  result  was  a 
contlnnation  of  the  war,  with  greater  ftiry  tban  bad  heretofore  distinguished  it.— tfewew  cftho 
War,  Chapter  XII. 


"  great  and  illustrious  power  of  England,"  we  deny  ;  it  is  writ- 
ten for  the  eyes  of  the  English  reader,  and  not  for  that  of  the 
Confederate. 

We  will  not  deny  that  the  Confederate  authorities  made  a 
great  mistake  in  not  purchasing  the  entire  cotton  crop  of  the 
South  at  the  commencement  of  the  war.  It  would  have  given 
the  South  the  command  of  an  immense  amount  of  specie  had 
the  ichole  crop  arrived  safely  at  foreign  ports,  but  Ve  very  much 
douht  if  such  a  thing  could  have  Been  done.  Another  great 
miscalculation  of  Mr.  Pollard  is,  that  it  would  have  yielded 
"two  shillings  sterling  ;"  it  could  never  have  yielded  much  more 
than  one.  although  that  would  have  left  the  government  a  large 
profit. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

.While  we  are  net  able  to  declare  Mr.  Memminger  wholly 
guiltless  of  causing  the  depreciation  of  the  currency  by  his  mal- 
ndministra  iou  of  the  Treasury  Department,  we  must,  neverthe- 
less, insist  that  he  is  not  wholly  responsible  for  it.  There  aro 
other  and  equally  importanl  h  led  to  its  rapid  depre- 

ciation, and  these  we  will  endeavor  to  point  out.* 

Mr.  Pollard  tells  us,  with  considerable  bitterness,  that  "in 
February,  1862,  President  Davis  had  made  the  most  extrava- 
gant congratulation  to  the  country  OH  our  financial  condition, 
in  comparison  with  that  of  the  North,"  and  4tin  less  than 
eighteen  months  thereafter,  when  g^hl  was  quoted  in 
York  at  twenty-five  per  cent,  premium,  it  was  selling  in  Rich- 
mond at  nine  hundred  per  cent,  premium  ;  and  by  the  time  that 
the  Confederate  Congress  met  in  l)<  gold  in  Kich- 

mond  was  worth  about  two  thousand   |  premium,  and 

was -publicly  sold  one  for  twent]  rale  notes."    The 

truth  of  this  statement  noi  nt  price  of 

i  shows;  :(  the  same  time  we  find  that  the  i  f  this 

is  oot  us  much  ou  ing  t<>  "  the  financial  wisdom"  of  the  Confed- 
erate Administration  .  I  of  the  people  in  their 
tnd  prodigal  expei                   the  currency.f  The  causes 

n  Idea  on  tl  it  bloek- 

ade  running  ha*  tided  to  any  considerable  dugll*  In  the  deprecialiea  af  the  currency.  The 
f%ci  in,  thai  \:  aided  in  keeping  it  up  than  other  wioe ;  whir!  nade  apparent  from 

the  fact,  that  the  goods  which  are  imported  into  the  South  are  genera: 
procerd?  of  cotton   i  nrted.     It  WOuM  t  u<  rt-nJf-r  the  cvrr>  ■ 

depredating  it,  for  the  importing  into  th    I  r  of  Urge  qnauHtici  of  articles  nc  t  n.  m 

nfacturtd  in  her  limit?,  would  occa-ion  a  rtduction  in  pri  Bated  bjtNM  of 

scarcity.  This  h.is  t<  •  D  .  vrrlooked  by  a  great  many  who  have  been  so  eager  to  denounce  the 
fvptetn  of  blockade  running,  but  if  the  fi  inject  vera  piveu  the  consideration  it  deserves,  they 
would  find  that  it  is  more  deserving  of  praise  than  of  censure. 

tin  Mr.  P,  Hard's  ";?e».ond  Year  of  the  War,''  he  charp-s  the  brokers  of  the  Confederacy 
with  being  aiders  and  abetter?  in  depreciating  the  currency,  and  only  allows  exceptions  to  the 
generality,     'i:  .  ,  for  thereat  true  and 


14 

I 

which  must  be  laid  down  as  the  source  of  depreciation,  are 
these:  A  superabundant  amount  of  money  afloat,  being  five  or 
six  times  more  than  was  necessary  for  the  business  of  the 
country. 

This,  Mr.  Memminger  endeavored  to  prevent  by  offering  in- 
ducements to  the  holders  of  the  treasury  notes  to  fund.  J  This 
was,  no  doubt,  a  most  excellent  plan  of  keeping  the  currency 
within  a  prudent  limit,  but  failed  from  causes  which  we  shall 
hereafter  relate. 

The  next  cause  was -the  action  of  the  people  in  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  necessities  of  the  government,  and  the  scarcity  of 
food,  to  place  enormous  valuation  on  their  products,  and  which 
was  paid  from  the  absolute  necessity  for  all  possessed  by  these 
speculators  and  extortioners. 

This  is,  without  doubt,  the  principal  cause  of  the  deprecia- 
tion of  Confederate  treasury  notes.  Both  the  planter  and  the 
merehant  must  be  blamed  for  it,  and  not  the  administration. — 
These  two  classes  of  the  people  made  a  necessity  which  never 
existed,  and  by  their  extortion  compelled  the  issuance  of  a 
much  larger  amount  of  money  that  would  have  been  expended, 
had  the  price  of  any  supplies  been  held,  at  the  same  rates  as 
when  the  war  first  commenced.  To  prove  this  argument  does 
not  require  much  words.  It  must  be  plain  to  all,  that  where 
the  government  has  to  pay  six  dollars  per  bushel  for  wheat  at 
the  present  time,  it  throws  upon  the  country  four  dollars  more 
of  the  currency  than  would  otherwise  have  been  expended  had 
the  price  continued  at  two  dollars,  which  was  the  outside  cost 
of  wheat  at  the  commencement  of  the  war. 

The  last  cause  was  the  conduct  of  a  few  traitors  in  our  midst, 
who  purchased  gold  with  treasury  notes  as  fast  as  they  accu- 
mulated them,  and  thus  caused  the  great  advance  on  the  price 
of  specie. 

After  the  currency  had  depreciated  five  hundred  per  cent,  it 


loyal  citizens  of  the  South.  Those  who  sold  Federal  currency  publicly  in  Richmond  are  trai- 
tors to  their  country,  and  should  not  cause  the  whole  of  that  class,  which  follow  the  profession 
of  brokers,  to  bear  an  ill  n^me.  For  a  broker  to  deal  in  gold  and  silver  coin,  is  no  more  than 
he  has  been  always  accustomed  to  do,  while  his  profits  at  the  present  time  are  much  smaller 
than  those  of  any  other  business.  For  instance,  where  they  pay  eighteen  and  a  half  dollars  in 
Confederate  currency  for  one  in  gold,  they  soil  the  same  for  twenty,  being  a  profit  not  exceed- 
ing nine  per  cent.  In  making  these  remarks  we  do  not  intend  to  defend  the  brokers,  we  only 
desire  to  show  a  few  facts. 

Jit  may  be  said  that  if  even  this  could  have  been  carried  out,  that  the  number  of  bonds 
thrown  on  the  market  from  the  purchase  of  cotton,  would  have  been  so  large  that  they  would 
have  depreciated  as  soon  as  treasury  notes.  We  see  no  reason  for  such  argument,  from  the 
fact  that  such  bonds  bearing  eight  per  cent,  interest,  the  man  who  was  possessed  of  fifty  thou- 
sand dollars  worth,  would  have  been  more  ttUposed  to  receive  four  thousand  dollars  per  an- 
num from  the  interest,  than  to  hare  sold  it  for  gold  at  a  depreciated  rate.  It  would  not  have 
been  looked  upon  as  money,  but  as  an  article  of  remuneratfve  worth,  *nd  when  we  consider  that 
eight  per  cent,  was  looked  upon  as  a  la'-ge  profit,  before  the  depreciation  of  treasury  notes,  we 
cannot  fail  to  see  that  capitalists  would  have  eagerly  bought  them,  not  only  at  but  above  par. 
The  issuance  of  treasury  notes,  with  bonds  at  the  same  time,  would  naturally  tend  to  depreci- 
ate the  value  of  the  latter,  for  the  constant  influx  of  the  treasury  notes  naturally  increases  the 
price  of  all  ar.icles,  and  wi>h  them  the  profits.  Thus,  when  treasury  notes  had  depreciated  one 
hundred  per  cent,  the  profits  on  merchandize  and  labor  increased  in  proportion,  and  o  one 
who  could  make  ten  thousand  dollars  on  an  outlay  of  twenty  thousand  dollars  in  treasury 
notes,  would  take  these  same  notes  and  purchase  tweuty  thousand  dollars  of  bonds  to  receive 
an  interest  of  only  sixteen  hundred  in  the  same  currency, — R&oi&v)  oftha  War. 


15 

was  absolutely  ridiculous  to  quote  it  at  a  specie  valuation. 
Gold,  silver  and  foreign  exchange  then  became  mere  articles  of 
merchandize,  worth  more  than  anything  else ;  they  could  not  be 
looked  upon  as  money,  simply  for  the  reason  that  they  were 
never  used  as  such  in  the  Confederacy,  and  we  had  no  commer- 
cial dealings  with  the  outside  world. 

The  comparison  between  the  North  and  South,  on  the  finance 
question,  is  unjust  to  the  administration,  and  absurd  in  itself.- — 
The  cause  of  the  currency  of  the  United  States  not  depreciat- 
ing as  rapidly  as  that  of  the  South,  is  attributable  to  several 
reasons.  In  the  North  there  has  always  been  more  wheat  and 
other  cereals  raised  than  was  neeessary  for  her  population,  and 
which  surplus  was  sold  to  the  South  previous  to  the  war.  After 
the  war  commenced  and  all  commerce  ceased  this  surplus  be- 
came a  drug  on  the  holders,  who  willingly  sold  it  at  a  low  price 
for  any  kind  of  money  that  would  purchase  other  articles.  In 
this  instance  the  supply  exceeded  the  demand,  and  wherever 
this  occurred  we  find  that  money  is  appreciated.  Another  great 
assistance  to  the  currency  of  the  United  States  was  their  largo 
population,  as  well  as  their  free  and  unrestricted  trade  witli  the 
world.  They  were  in  a  much  better  condition  to  absorb  a  large 
amount  of  paper  money  than  the  South,  who  had  no  Other 
source  of  using  the  treasury  notes  circulated  ju  her  midst,  than 
by  a  system  of  speculation  alike  dishonorable  and  unpatriotic. 

While  wc  cannot  say  much  in  defence  of  Mr.  Memminger, 
there  is  one  thing  certain,  that  the  people  have  been  as  much  to 
blame  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  We  acknowledge  that 
xhort  sighted  financial  ability  was  exhibited  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  treasury  department,  but  ire  insist  that  the  evils 
which  resulted  from  such  administration,  were  made  doubly 
aggravated  by  the  unpatriotic  and  suicidal  conduct  of  those  who 
possessed  the  mass  of  the  currency,  in  not  funding  as  off 
and  the  speculating  and  extorting  spirit  of  the  merchant  and 
farmer  in  creating  a  necessity  wh^re  n<        t  d  in  reality. 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  next  subject  which  comes  under  Mr.  Pollard's  notice, 
"  is  the  disclosure  from  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  Mr. 
James  Seddon,  that  the  effective  force  of  the  army  was  not, 
more  than  a  half,  never  two-thirds  of  the  numbers  in  the  ranks," 
and  this  fact  is  attributed  wholly  and  solely  to  the  Secretary  or, 
to  use  Mr.  Pollard's  words,  "the  fault  of  his  own  administra- 
tion, the  remissness  of  discipline,  the  weak  shunning  of  the 
death  penalty  in  our  armies,  and  that  paltry  quackery  which 


16 

proposed  to  treat  the  great  evil  of  desertion  with  *  proclama- 
tions and  patriotic  appeals.' " 

Here  we  have  a  perfect  plethora  of  charges  brought  against 
the  administration  of  the  war  department;  the  first  of  which  is 
said  to  be  u  the  fault  of  his  non-administration."  This  is  not 
correct.  It  is  hazarding  an  assertion  which  cannot  be  proven. 
In  what  manner  has  the  administration  of  Mr.  Seddon  influenc- 
ed desertion  and  absenteeism  from  the  Confederate  army  ?  Sure- 
ly, in  making  such, a  charge,  the  grounds  on  which  they  are 
made  might  have  been  given.  We  see  no  cause  to  censure  Mr. 
Seddon's  administration  of  the  War  Department.  On  the  con- 
trary, his  conduct,  since  his  appointment  to  that  office,  has  crea- 
ted great  satisfaction  among  the  people,  who  were  apprehensive 
that  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Randolph  would  leave  the  va«ant 
place  difficult  to  fill  in  an  efficient  manner. 

The  next,  charge,  of  "remissness-  of  discipline,"  is  only  par- 
tially correct,  and  must  be  laid  to  the  officers  and  not  to  the 
administration.  All  orders  necessary  to  the  strict  enforcement 
of  discipline  are  issued  by  the  War  Department,  and  if  the 
commanders  of  troops,  by  their  neglect  of  duty,  cause  desertion 
and  absenteeism  from  the  army,  and  the  fact  of  such  neglect  is 
not  reported  to  the  War  Department,  no  blame  can  be  attached 
thereto  for  any  such  remissness.  Commanding  Generals,  and 
not  the  Secretary  of  War,  must  be  held  responsible,  for  the 
soldiers  who  are  thus  remiss  in  discipline,  are  under  their  im- 
mediate eye,  and  it  is  their  dufcy  to  enforce  a  proper  obedience 
of  the  regulations. 

A  "  weak  shunning  of  the  death  penalty  in  our  armies"  fol- 
lows the  last  charge,  and  here  Mr.  Pollard  again  falls  into  error. 
Death  has  been  inflicted  too  often,  and  without  any  effect  on 
the  comrades  of  those  who  have  died  thus  disgracefully.  What 
then  was  left  to  the  government,  when  punishment  failed  to  act 
asaw  arning  to  others  who  deserted  or  absented  themselves 
from  the  ranks.  Appeals  to  their  patriotism  were  not  only 
needed,  but  served  the  purpose  of  restoring  many  to  the  ranks 
who  would  never  have  gone  otherwise.  In  not  one  of  the 
charges  enumerated  above,  do  we  find  sufficient  explanation  for 
the  desertion  and  absenteeism  from  our  army,  while  other 
causes,  more  truthful,  are  neglected,  because  they  reflect  direct- 
ly upon  the  people,  whose  good  opinions  is  what  Mr.  Pollard 
appears  most  to  desire. 

One  great  cause  of  the  absenteeism  and  desertion  from  the 
Confederate  army,  can  be  found  in  the  conduct  of  the  people  at 
home.  A  soldier  leaves  his  family  at  home,  and  serves  his 
country  for  the  miserable  pittance  of  eleven  dollars  per  month.* 

*  On  a  late  visit  to  the  "  Army  of  Tennessee,"  we  were  in  enru mimical  ion  with  a  soldier  who 
had  been  sentenced  to  wear  a  barrel  shirt  as  a  punishment  for  absenting  himself  without  leave 
for  some  weeks.  On  inquiring  the  cause  which  led  to  desertion,  we  htiard  that  his  wife  and 
children  were  in  destitute  condition,  on  account  of  the  depreciation  of  the  currency,  and  their 
inability  to  uiak»>  asufiicieBCy  of  it,  and  had  written  acquainting  him  of  her  deplorable  position. 


17 

During  his  absence,  the  short-sighted  policy  of  the  government, 
aided  by  a  heartless  crowd  of  speculators  and  extortioners,  de- 
preciates the  currency  of  the  country  to  such  a  degree  that  it 
takes  a  large  sum  of  it  to  support  his  family.  They  have  no 
way  of  obtaining  the  required  amount,  and  consequently  great 
destitution  ensues.  The  result  is  that  the  soldier  desert*.  Who 
can  be  blamed  for  this?  Not  the  Secretary  of  War;  it  is  the 
people — they  whose  property  the  soldier  tights  to  protect — who 
cause  desertion  from  the  army.  They  have  either  caused  the 
family  of  a  soldier  to  sufter  for  want  of  food,  or  have  instilled 
their  cowardly  fears  in  his  breast,  and  thus  influenced  him  to 
desert.  To  the  people — that  is  those  at  home — must  be  attrib- 
uted the  frequent  desertions  from  the  army.  It  is  an  undenia- 
ble fact,  whatever  may  be  said  on  the  subject.  Experience  has 
shown  it,  and  communication  with  the  soldiers  will  prove  it. 
The  other  causes  which  lead  to  desertion  and  absenteeism  are 
but  small,  when  brought  in  comparison  with  the  statements 
above.  This  is  the  ground  we  have  taken  upon  the  subject,  and 
impartial  history  will  agree  with  us. 

The  attack  of  Mr.  Pollard  on  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  re- 
commending "  the  supercedure  of  all  exemptions  by  a  system 
of  details  in  the  War  Department,"  is  unworthy  in  every  re- 
spect. We  cannot  see  that  "such  measures  were  finished  pieces 
of  demago<rueism/'  We  recognize  it,  and  so  do  all  impartial 
minds,  as  a  patriotic  desire  to  place  every  man  in  sen  ice  who 
owes  duty  to  the  country.  It  was  for  the  purpose  ot  removing 
all  chances  of  fraud  in  the  granting  of  exemptions,  and  so  the 
motive  appeared  to  every  unbiassed  mind  in  the  Confederacy. 
The  term  u demagogueisinM  cannot  be  fitly  applied  to  Mr.  8 
don's  propositions  to  Congress.  There  is  no  single  way  in  which 
they  could  recommend  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  soldiers,  other 
than  a  natural  admiration  for  his  solicitude  lor  the  (real  caQM 
in  which  we  are  engaged.  It  is  a  mistaken  idea  on  the  pnrt  of 
some,  that  the  soldier  is  blind  to  the  importance  of  bating  a 
portion  of  the  able-bodied  men  of  the  south  exempt.  None 
appreciate  the  necessity  more  than  they  do,  or  will  be  more 
eager  to  grant  the  claims  of  the  exempt.  It  is,  therefore,  but 
a  poor  charge,  when  the  accusation  of  demagogueism  is  brought 
agaiust  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  performing  an  act  which  he 
thought  both  conscience  and  duty  required  of  him. 

With  respect  to  the  recommendation  to  annul  the  exemptions 
heretofore  granted  to  those  who  had  furnished  substitutes,  we 
see  no  just  cause  to  term  it  an  act  of  perfidy.  The  government 
gained  nothing  by  permitting  those  who  furnished  substitutes 

With  all  his  love  of  country,  the  affections  of  a  husband  and  father  reigned  paramount  in  hi* 
heart,  and  he  desetted.  On  arriving  at  home,  he  found  that  his  wife  had  not  exaggerated  in 
her  statement,  but  was  in  a  dreadful  situation.  Alter  being  with  her  for  some  time,  he  was  ar- 
rested, carried  back  to  the  army,  tried  and  sentenced.  The  tone  of  manly  candor  with  which 
he  spoke  impressed  us  favorably,  and  though  we  did  not  think  any  inducement  sufficient  t« 
excuse  desertion,  we  left  him  with  a  sigh  of  rejrret  at  his  unhappv  position. 

2 


18 

to  be  exempt,  nor  was  any  contract  ever  made  between  these 
parties  and  the  government.  It  was  merely  a  privilege  accorded 
by  Congress,  to  exempt  from  military  duty  any  one  subject  to 
conscription,  who  placed  a  substitute  in  the  army  for  three 
years.  It  do^s  not  state  how  long  the  principal  shall  be  exempt, 
while  it  distinctly  required  .that  the  substitute  should  enter  tlae 
service  for  a  given  number  of  years.  What  "  argument  of  the 
despot,"  what  "infamy,"  what  "  perfidy"  can  be  charged,  with 
any  truth,  against  the  administration  in  this  respect?  The  idea 
is  ridiculous,  and  would  be  laughed  at  by  the  poorest  lawyer  in 
the  Confederacy,  were  his  opinion  asked  upon  the  legality  or 
illegality  of  the  law  annulling  substitution  and  calling  into  ser- 
vice the  principals. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  question  of  retaliation  is  one  which  became  perfectly  fu- 
tile after  the  enemy  held  a  larger  number  of  prisoners  than  the 
South  did,  for  though  we  may  all  bitterly  deplore  tl  e  outrages 
committed  by  the  enemy,  and  become  justly  indignant  at  them, 
we  must,  nevertheless,  recollect  that  retaliation  at  any  time 
when  it  was  called  for  by  the  acts  of  the  Federals,  was  not  only 
dangerous,  but  would  have  resulted  in  the  sacrifice  of  many  of 
our  men,  whose  lives  were  of  far  greater  value  than  those  of  the 
Federals.  It  has  been  a  noticeable  fact,  that  while  the  Confed- 
erate Government  held  a  greater  or  equal  number  of  prisoners 
in  its  possession,  no  act  was  committed  by  the  United  States 
authorities  which  called  for  retaliation.  It  was  only,  as  in  the 
present  case,  when  that  government  possessed  a  majority  of 
prisoners  that  any  necessity  existed  for  such  a  retaliation.  What 
then  could  be  expected  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  authori- 
ties? Take  as  an  example  the  case  of  the  two  Yankee  officers 
who  were  drawn  by  lots  to  die,  in  retaliation  for  the  murder  of 
Captains  Corbin  and  McGraw  by  Buniside.  Was  not  the  lite  of 
such  a  man  as  the  son  of  General  Lee,  worth  more  than  those 
of  the  two  Federal  officers  ?  Such  was  the  opinion  of  all,  and 
none  regretted  that  the  Confederate  authorities  did  not  put 
their  threat  in  execution. 

The  fact  is,  that  the  question  of  retaliation  should  never  have 
been  left  to  the  government.  It  was  one  of  great  delicacy  for 
the  administration  of  a  people  to  sanction,  much  less  to  order, 
and  its  being  forced  directly  under  the  notice  of  the  govern- 
ment was  an  act  of  the  people  which  could  and  should  bave  been 
avoided.  In  all  the  outrages  commit  ted  by  Federal  officers  and 
soldiers,  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  net" one  has  been  directly 
upheld  or  approved  by  the  United  States  government.  It  is 
true  that  whenever  an  explanation  was  demanded  it  was  always 
(shirked  by  some  paltry  device,  which  indicated  an  indirect  if 


19 

not  a  fiiicct  approval;  still  it  1  iad   never  officially  count 

these  outrages,    Retalial  ion  should  have  betn  I< 

and  men  of  the  Cgni  army,  as  w  ntly  exhibited  \\\ 

North   Carolina.     T<  it  on   the   government,  is   I 

it   in  a  doubtful   position,  lor  it  would  Ik  worthy  of  a 

civilized   nation,  to  &/  y  to  woik   and  order   the  i 

cution  of  a  prisoner  in   retalj  a   murder  committed   by 

an  enemy  months  pre"* 

For   both    governments,   to  commence,  officially,  tl 
thirsty  retaliation  desin  i   by  Mr.  Pollard,    is  to  merge  this  war 
from  that   of  a  civilised   one  into  thai  .  in 

other  , words,  a  literal  raising  of  the  "  black  flag."  Is  such  a 
thiiiLT  desired  by  the  Boldiers  of  the  Conf<  derate  army?  With 
the  riak  of  b(  in  -  i  ha»g<  d  with  slai 

those  men  who  loudly  call  for  the*'  '  retaliate 

in  the  security  of  their  h<  'hey  are  not.     H 

is  scarcely  a  m;;n   in  the  service,  who   m  no(  '  ;"•  rly  <  p| 

j  act    of  the   Coifi  rnment   which   would 

this  war  t<»  the  same  couditt 

Genghis,  Khan  and  other  barbarians,    Thj  ich  we 

■  ii.il  km  I  h  ith  the 

army,  ami  one  wh 

Refer  ling  {<<    I  .  and    the 

remarks  be  made  relative 
Mr.  Pollard  charges  him  with  ha\ 
of  his  "  tbrcateniugs  with   respect  to   i 

to  say  that  tk  they  aj v  a    r  of 

w&akne*  u  a  i, i.'Ii  the  ht  well  tin  n 

his  hack."     This  i*.  ridiculous   and 

1 1  ■  1 1  ot'  a  subii  el  wh 
value  to  the   peoj       so  far  as  1  .  :>  not 

noticing  it  laid ;   and  malicious,]  opportunity 

for  heaping  another  paragraph   of  abu  th<    President, 

both  undeserved  by  hi u  aud  uni  ;.     writer. 


v  HAPTER  VII. 

Few  meu  in  public  position  1  a  >ed  censure,  and  it  were 

absurd  to  expect  that    PreiidenJ;  Davis  should   escape  what  a 
Washington   received,  still,  there  are  times  when   such  censure 
becomes  wholly  undeserved,  and  pierges  frpra  a  desin 
the  country,  into  a  desii  va  the  private  ends  of  a  partisan 

spirit,  filled  with  prejudice  and  blind  to  everything  but  a  hope 
for  the  removal  or  defamation  of  the  party  against  whom  such 
prejudice  is  directed.     We  do  not  n  Mr.  Pollard  of  being 

actuated  by  a  desire  to  have  President  Davis  removed,  or  by 
his  hasty  and  unjust  attacks,  cause  him  to  resign,  still   it  must 


be  apparent,  to  all  who  have  read  his  "  First  and  Second  Years 
of  the  War,"  and  the  "  Rival  Administrations,"  that  nothing 
bat  an  undeserved  prejudice  actuated  that  gentleman. 

When  we  look  on  the  work  performed  by  the  administration, 
and  the  successes  which  have  attended  it,  all  the  errors  com- 
mitted become  insignificant.  The  formation  of  this  government 
in  the  midst  of  an  excitement  consequent  upon  the  secession  of 
the  different  States;  the  organization  of  armies  which  have  be- 
come the  terror  of  enemies,  the  wonder  of  the  world,  and  the 
pride  of  friends ;  and  last,  though  the  most  important  of  all, 
the  long  list  of  brilliant  victories  which  have  crowned  the  ban- 
ners of  the  Confederacy,  are  proof  enough  of  the  ability  and 
energy  of  the  administration.  When  the  question  is  asked,  what 
has  the  present  Secretary  of  War  done?  Justice  points  to  the 
present  condition  of  our  armies;  their  improvement,  both  in 
numbers  and  morale,  to  what  they  were  three  months  ago,  and 
the  voice  of  censure  is  silent.  To  blame  Mr.  Seddon  for  any 
of  the  disasters  which  have  occured  during  his  administration, 
is  both  false  and  ridiculous.  So  far  from  deserving  blame,  just 
praise  is  due  to  him  for  the  very  efficient  manner  in  which  he 
has  performed  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  War.  The  causes  of 
this  censure  of  Mr.  Seddon  becomes  apparent,  however,  in  the 
"little  piece  of  history"  which  Mr.  Pollard  gives  the  public  in 
his  "  Rival  Administrations."  It  appears  more  like  a  feeling  of 
unmanly  jealousy  at  the  chance  afforded  a  literary  rival,  by  the 
exemption  granted.  We  feel  certain  that  good  reasons  must 
have  been  laid  before  the  Secretary  of  War  to  have  induced  him 
to  grant  an  exemption  to  the  party  alluded  to,  and  if  report 
speaks  true,  that  he  is  the  author  of  "  Causes  and  Contrasts," 
we  can  easily  believe  that  the  history  of  the  war  he  is  engaged 
in  compiling,  will  be  of  greater  service  to  the  Confederate  cause 
than  the  partial  and  partisan  compilation  of  events  presented  to 
the  public  by  the  author  of  the  u  Rival  Administrations." 

As  with  the  Secretary  of  War,  so  with  the  other  officers  in 
authority,  and  we  need  say  no  more  on  the  subject.  At  some 
other  time  we  may  be  induced  to  give  to  the  public  the  causes 
which  have  led  to  this  gross  abuse  of  President  Davis  and  his 
administration  ;  at  present  we  will  close  this  brief  work  by  ob- 
serving that  it  would  be  preferable  for  the  North  to  overrun 
twice  as  much  Southern  soil  as  she  already  has,  than  for  the 
Confederacy  to  lose  the  services  of  Jefferson  Davis.  With  all 
his  faults  there  is  none  in  the  Confederacy  who  possesses  the 
high  administrative  talent  that  he  does,  and  though  the  voice 
of  malice  and  censure  may  endeavor  for  awhile  to  deprive  him 
of  that  praise  he  has  so  well  merited  by  his  successful  adminis- 
tration of  the  government,  the  time  will  surely  come  when  he 
will  receive  the  thanks  and  blessings  of  a  free  people,  and  he 
looked  upon  as  the  Seconi?  Washington  of  the  Southern  States 
of  America. 


